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RULE 13e-3 AND THE GOING PRIVATE DILEMMA:
THE SEC's QUEST FOR A SUBSTANTIVE
FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
The act of a public corporation "going private"' often evokes a ques-
tion of fairness and fiduciary responsibility2 to minority shareholders.
In response to the marked increase in going private transactions the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently promulgated rule
13e-33 and related Schedule 13e-34 to prevent fraudulent or unfair
transactions on the part of majority shareholders in their dealings with
minority shareholders.
Although rule 13e-3 does not impose an explicit substantive fairness
standard on going private transactions, the rule prescribes such rigid
disclosure requirements regarding the effects, purposes, and fairness of
1. "Going private" refers to the act of transforming a publicly held corporation-one whose
stock is bought and sold at an exchange or over the counter-into one which is no longer listed or
available to the public for purchase. Pursuant to § 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1976), most issuers having outstanding equity security held by 500 or more
persons must register the security with the SEC and are thereby subject to the periodic reporting
requirements imposed by §§ 13 and 15(d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (1976 &
Supp. 1978). For an in depth analysis of the going private concept, see 4 A. BROMBERO, SECUI-
TIES LAW: FRAUD (New Matter) § 4.7 (Supp. 1977); F. O'NEL, "SQuETzE-ouTs" OF MINORTY
SHAREHOLDERS § 5.32 (1975); F. O'NEAL & J. DERWIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS
AssocIATES § 4.01-.12 (1961); Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 987 (1974); Brudney, .4 Note on "Going Private" 61 VA. L. REv. 1019 (1975); Greene,
Corporate Freeze-out Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1976); Kerr, Going
Private. Adopting a Corporate Purpose Standard, 3 SEc. REO. L.J. 33 (1975); Moore, Going Private
Techniques and Problems of Eliminating the Public Shareholder, 1 J. CoRP. L. 321 (1976); Solo-
mon, Going Private: Business Practices, Legal Mechanics, Judicial Standards and Proposals for
Reform, 25 BUFFALO L. REv. 141 (1975); Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's
Appraisal Right, 77 HARe. L. REV. 1189 (1964); Note, "Going Private"-The Insider's Fiduciary
Duty and Rule lOb-5: Is Fairness Requisite?, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 565 (1976); Note, FederalRegula-
tion of the Going Private Phenomenon, 6 CUM. L. REV. 141 (1975); Comment, SEC Proposed "Go-
ing Private" Rule, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 184 (1978); Comment, Protection of Minority Shareholders
From Freeze-outs Through Merger, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1421 (1976).
A going private transaction is either a one step or two step acquisition. A one step transaction
may be a long form or short form merger, tender offer, reverse stock split, dissolution, or open
market purchase. See notes 14-24 infra and accompanying text. The first step of a two step acqui-
sition may be accomplished by a negotiated purchase from a control group, a purchase on the
open market, or a tender offer. The second step may be accomplished by a short form or long
form merger.
2. 44 Fed. Reg. 46,736 (1979).
3. Rule 13e-3, Going Private Transactions by Certain Issuers or Their Affiliates, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13e-3 (1980).
4. Schedule 13E-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1980).
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the transaction that a fairness objective is clearly implicit in its provi-
sions. The Commission's implicit fairness objective has prompted com-
mentators to contend that the Commission's preoccupation with the
fairness of going private transactions is beyond the mandate that Con-
gress granted in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.5 Rule 13e-3 has
thus provoked vigorous debate regarding the propriety of SEC investi-
gation into the substantive fairness of going private transactions and,
indeed, SEC substantive rulemaking authority in general.
This Note will trace the development of rule 13e-3 and study its ex-
tensive disclosure provisions to determine whether a substantive fair-
ness rationale lies therein. To understand these issues, however, it is
necessary to understand the going private phenomenon and why the
SEC enacted rule 13e-3. Finally, this Note will conclude with a consid-
eration of whether the SEC does indeed have a substantive fairness
authority within the context of rule 13e-3.
I. THE GOING PRIVATE PHENOMENON
Going private describes the various techniques that a publicly held
corporation employs to return to private status by reacquisition of pub-
licly held stock,6 thereby excluding public shareholders from further
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976).
6. For example, majority shareholders may initiate an asset sale or a corporate dissolution
proceeding and then sell their assets to a "shell" corporation. See, e.g., LeBold v. Inland Steel
Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 675 (1941), modledon rehearing, 136 F.2d 876
(7th Cir. 1943). At common law, in the absence of a provision in the corporate charter the sale of
all the assets of a solvent corporation required unanimous consent. See, e.g., Traer v. Lucas Pros-
pecting Co., 124 Iowa 107, 112, 99 N.W. 290, 292 (1904); City of St. Louis v. St. Louis Gaslight
Co., 70 Mo. 69 (1879). But see Butler v. New Keystone Copper Co., 10 Del. Ch. 371, 377, 93 A.
380, 382-83 (1915); Skinner v. Smith, 134 N.Y. 240, 31 N.E. 911, 10 N.Y.S. 81 (1892); Note, Dispo-
sition of Corporate Assets, 43 N.C. L. REv. 957, 958 (1965). Today, however, almost all states
permit corporations to sell their assets without unanimous shareholder approval. See generally 2
MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 79 (2d ed. 1971); TEXAS Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.10 (Vernon
Supp. 1978).
Corporate insiders may also make a tender offer to purchase all outstanding shares. See, e.g.,
Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12, 13-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd per cur/am, 514 F.2d 283
(2d Cir. 1975); Broder v. Dane, 384 F. Supp. 1312, 1315-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also SEC Securi-
ties Exchange Act Release No. 5567, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
1 80,104, at 85,090 (Feb. 6, 1975); Borden, supra note 1, at 1003-06; Brudney, supra note 1, at 910-
11; Kerr, supra note 1, at 34.
If a substantial number of stockholders refuse to accept the tender offer, insiders may utilize
various "mop up" techniques. See Securities Exchange Act Release, supra, at 85,091; Borden,
supra note 1, at 999-1000; Kerr, supra note 1, at 44-45; Note, GoingPrivate, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 910-
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participation in the enterprise.7 Before a corporation implements a go-
ing private transaction, minority shareholders generally may choose
between selling their shares8 or retaining their status as shareholders in
the private firm.9 This choice, however, is not a true option because the
liquidity of a private security in the trading market is greatly im-
paired.10 Moreover, remaining shareholders in a private corporation
11 (1975). See generally Note, Federal Regulation of the Going Private Phenomenon, 6 CuM. L.
REV. 141, 160 & n.115 (1975).
The corporation can employ a reverse stock split, so the smaller security holders retain only a
fraction of the whole share. The corporation may then purchase those shares for cash. See, eg.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 155 (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 513 (McKinney 1963). See also
Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 59 Ill. 2d 452, 322 N.E.2d 54 (1974), appeal dismissed, 422
U.S. 1002 (1975); Clark v. Pattern Analysis & Recognition Corp., 87 Misc. 2d 385, 384 N.Y.S.2d
660 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Securities Exchange Act Release, supra, at 85,090-91; H. HENN, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 673 (2d ed. 1970); Borden, supra note 1, at 994-97, 999-1000;
Dykstra, The Reverse Stock Split-That Other Means of Going Private, 53 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1
(1976); Kerr, supra note 1, at 44-45; Lawson, Reverse Stock Splits: The Fiduciary's Obligations
Under State Law, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1226 (1975); Note, Federal Regulation of the Going Private
Phenomenon, supra, at 146-51; Note, Going Private, supra, at 910-11.
Majority shareholders also may employ a merger to "freeze out" minority shareholders. See,
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251-52 (Supp. 1978); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 903 (McKinney
Supp. 1979). See generally Kessler, Elimination of Minority Interests by Cash Merger. Two Recent
Cases, 30 Bus. LAW. 699 (1975); Vorenberg, supra note 1, at 1192-93.
Insiders may merge by transferring their shares in the "target" corporation to a "shell" corpora-
tion. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Institutional Inv. Sys., Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 95,231 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (publicly owned corporation eliminated all minority share-
holders by means of tender offer followed by merger); Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette,
Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla. 1974), aft'd, 521 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975) (tender offer followed
by merger of publicly held corporation into subsidiary of target corporation's principal share-
holder).
For a thorough review of all available going private techniques, see F. O'NEAL & J. DERWIN,
EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES §§ 4.01-.14, at 61-98 (1961); Borden, supra
note 1, at 989-1000; Kerr, supra note 1. at 44-45.
7. See note 1 supra. Going private transactions cause a reduction or elimination of public
holdings in the corporation's stock. See T. ARMSTRONG, "GOING PRIVATE" THE WHY AND THE
How, IN ACQUIRING PUBLICLY HELD SECURITIES: GOING PRIVATE AND TENDER OFFERS 171
(PLI 1974).
8. The offer to purchase is generally only the first step in a going private transaction. See
note 1 supra. Because "every corporation has its share of irrational investors who would never
willingly abandon their investment," Note, Going Private, supra note 6, at 910, the minority is
seldom totally eliminated without the second involuntary step, the force-out. See, e.g., Greenberg
v. Institutional Inv. Sys., Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,231
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
9. See, e.g., id.
10. See Address by A.A. Sommer, Jr., "Going Private": A Lesson in Corporate Responsibil-
ity, Law Advisory Council Lecture, Notre Dame Law School (Nov. 20, 1974), reprinted in [1974-
1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 80,010, at 84,696.
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lose much of the protection provided by federal securities laws."
In its incipiency the going private phenomenon took place in an eco-
nomic climate of great optimism and enthusiastic speculative interest.12
The United States economy began to plunge into recession in 1974,13
however, and the market dropped catastrophically. The trend toward
registration with the SEC subsided, and stocks began selling at far
lower price-earning multiples.14 As a result of this economic downturn,
corporate managers began to decide that their best investment was to
reacquire their own securities from public shareholders, thereby be-
coming stockholders in a new, privately held enterprise.' 5
A number of reasons exist for going private. The 1934 Act requires
registration of securities by companies that either have securities listed
on a national securities exchange,' 6 or assets in excess of $1,000,000
and at least five hundred shareholders.' 7 Private status avoids 8 the
necessity of complying with the restrictive and financially burdensome
network of Exchange Act provisions that would otherwise regulate the
corporation's affairs. 19 Thus, it is not surprising that many public com-
11. House of Adler, Inc., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,515, at
81,114 (SEC Staff Letter Sept. 30, 1971).
12. In fiscal year 1950, 496 companies filed registration statements; 112 were by companies
that previously had not fied a registration statement. In fiscal year 1961, 1830 companies filed
registration statements; 958 were first filings. In fiscal year 1962, 2307 companies filed registration
statements; 1377 were first filings. 1 REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R.
Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963). The fact that 3000 companies filed registration state-
ments for the first time in the period between 1967 and 1972 illustrates the increasing trend of
going public until 1974. See Address of A.A. Sommer, Jr., supra note 10. A rocky stock market
was largely responsible for the going private phenomenon. The bull market of the late sixties and
early seventies prompted many corporations to go public. See generally Sommer, SEC Now Set
For Next Going Private Wave, Legal Times of Washington, Sept. 3, 1979, at 19, col. 1.
13. Hooper, Market Comment, FoREs,;Jan. 15, 1975, at 55.
14. See general, 33 SEC STATISTICAL BULLETIN 35 (May 15, 1974).
15. See Freeman, Going Private: Corporate Insiders Move to Eliminate Outside Shareholders,
Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1974, at 1, col. 6. See also Hershman, Going Private-Or How to Squeeze
Investors, Dun's Rev., Jan. 1975, at 37.
16. Securities Exchange. Act of 1934, § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1976 & Supp. 1978).
17. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(g)(l)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)(B) (1976).
18. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(g)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(l)(B) (1976). See [1978] 2
NYSE GUIDE (CCH) 2499.20, 2500; [1972] 2 AM. STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) 10,051.
19. Section 13 of the 1934 Act requires certain periodic reports to be sent to the SEC to keep
information in the initial report current. Securities Exchange Act, § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)
(1976 & Supp. 1978). Section 14, and Regulation 14A which implements it, govern the solicitation
of proxies by registered companies. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976);
SEC Reg. 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 (1980). Section 16(a) requires officers, directors, and ten
percent stockholders of registered companies to report trading in the company's stock. Securities
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panies have seized the opportunity to go private and preclude "those
zealous cops at the SEC" from entering into their corporate affairs. 20
Going private not only frees the corporation from the expense of com-
plying with federal securities laws, but also allows the company to
regain confidentiality of corporate information. 21 The increasing inci-
dence of going private transactions has drawn blunt criticism,22 and a
growing number of dissenting shareholders are challenging their man-
agement's efforts to go private.23
These challenges, as well as the promulgation of rule 13e-3, have led
to heated controversy regarding the propriety of going private. Critics
of the SEC's position argue that the minority shareholder has no abso-
lute right to continue participation in an enterprise that seeks to go
private.2 4 Proponents of the SEC, on the other hand, claim that corpo-
Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1976). Section 16(b) provides for the recapture
by the company of short swing profits made in the stock of that company by corporate insiders.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
20. Guzzardi, Those Zealous Cops on the Securities Beat, FORTUNE, Dec. 1974, at 144.
21. Eg., Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), a'd per curiam, 514
F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975). See Hershman, supra note 15.
22. See note I supra. One commentator stated: "It seems to me to be nothing less than
scandalous, and a species of downright fraud, for small corporations to go public at higher prices,
and then buy back substantial quantities of their stock at lower prices .... " (quoted in Address
by A.A. Sommer, Jr., Further Thoughts on "Going Private," Second Annual Securities Seminar of
the Detroit Institute for Continuing Legal Education, 294 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) D-1
(March 19, 1975, from unidentified source). See also Borden, supra note 1, at 1014; Kerr, Tender
Offers and Going Private-Ending Public Shareholding in Issue, 172 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 16, 1974, at 25,
col. 3; Note, Going Private: An Analysis of Federal and State Remedies, 44 FoRDHA.m L. REv. 796,
796 n.5; Note, Going Private, supra note 6, at 928.
23. Eg., Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), a dper curam, 514 F.2d
283 (2d Cir. 1975); University Capital Corp. v. Barbara Lynn Stores, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 94,949 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135
N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566 (1975).
24. Eg., Krafcisin v. LaSalle Madison Hotel Co., 11972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 93,586 (N.D. I11. 1972) (minority shareholders do not have right to continue their
participation in the corporation when the majority of controlling interests in 90% of the outstand-
ing shares voted to dissolve the corporation). See Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 37
Del. Ch. 558, 146 A.2d 785 (1958), alrd, 38 Del. Ch. 514, 154 A.2d 893 (Super. Ct. 1959); Wilcox
v. Stern, 18 N.Y.2d 195, 202, 219 N.E.2d 401, 404, 273 N.Y.S.2d 38, 43 (1966); Beloffv. Consoli-
dated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 19, 87 N.E.2d 561, 564-65 (1949); Anderson v. International Min-
erals & Chem. Corp., 295 N.Y. 343, 350, 67 N.E.2d 573, 576-77 (1946). But see Brudney, supra
note 1, at 1029-30.
Minority interests of less than 10% in Delaware and New Jersey, and less than 5% in New York,
constitute evidence that the legislative intent was to authorize the elimination of such minority
shareholders without giving them any recourse other than their right of appraisal. See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-373(f) (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1975); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A: 11-2 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623(k) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
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rations owe a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders to act in good
faith in all of their transactions.2" This duty, if fulfilled, could effec-
tively preclude many going private transactions. The conceptual ten-
sion between these two propositions underlies the failure of prior
attempts to successfully address the going private dilemma.
H. ATTEMPTS TO REDRESS GOING PRIVATE ABUSES PRIOR TO THE
ENACTMENT OF RULE 13e-3
To understand the traditional parameters of the federal securities
regulation scheme is to appreciate the inadequacy of prior attempts to
redress the problems that accompany many going private transactions.
Full and fair disclosure is the foundation26 of the federal securities reg-
ulation scheme.27
The rationale for the emphasis on disclosure rests upon two pur-
poses: First, to provide investors with sufficient information to enable
them to reach intelligent and volitional investment decisions,2" and sec-
ond, to deter fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative practices by pub-
licizing various material aspects of corporate transactions.29 Although
Congress did not grant a substantive fairness authority in either the
1933 or 1934 Act, Congress did intend to achieve a higher standard of
conduct and to eliminate the vestiges of caveat emptor within the secur-
ities industry.30
Although disclosure is effective in policing securities trading that is
conducted at arms length,3' going private transactions raise problems
between majority and minority shareholders that the 1933 and 1934
Acts did not anticipate or sufficiently address.32 Disclosure is effective
in determining fraudulent or deceptive conduct because it prevents
concealment of material information. The problems that arise from
many going private transactions are generally not fraud or deception,
25. See Brudney, supra note 1, at 1031-39; Gibson, How Fixed Are Class Shareholder
Rights?, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 283, 298-99 (1958).
26. See note 236 infra and accompanying text.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976).
28. See note 29 infra.
29. See Cant v. A.G. Beck6r & Co., 374 F. Supp. 36, 45 (N.D. Ill. 1974). See also SEC
Summary of Disclosure Policy Study Report [1963-1972 Special Studies Transfer Binder], FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 74,601, at 65,241.
30. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
31. 1 A. BROMBERG, SECuRins LAW: FRAUD § 4.7, at 88.95 (1974).
32. See notes 30-31 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 58:883
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss4/8
GOING PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS
but simple coercion. Because one of the parties is generally in a posi-
tion of control and has the ability to unilaterally dictate the terms of the
transaction, there is potential for abuse of minority shareholders. Dis-
closure neither negates the unconcealed coercive conduct that is char-
acteristic of many going private transactions, nor does it balance the
inequitable distribution of power between parties to the transaction.
Prior to an express SEC response to the going private problem, many
state and federal courts recognized this gap in the federal securities
scheme and fashioned a number of judicial remedies. These remedies
ranged from the implementation of judicially created fairness stan-
dards3 3 to federal court attempts to find a fairness test implicit in sec-
tion 10(b) of the 1934 Act3 4 and in rule lOb-5. 35 None of these judicial
remedies totally solved the going private dilemma.
A. State Remedies
The United States Supreme Court recently reiterated that state law
traditionally governs the duties owed by majority shareholders toward
minority shareholders. 36 Because a majority of going private tech-
niques are powers that state charters expressly grant to a corporation,37
these techniques are "internal affairs,"3 8 and are thus regulated by state
law.
State courts and legislatures, however, have not adequately regulated
going private transactions.39 Most states have practiced the "hands oft"
philosophy of going private activity. These states authorize procedures
33. In a number of early cases, courts protected minority shareholders' interests on the basis
of a perceived fiduciary duty to minority shareholders by the majority. See, e.g., Theis v. Spokane
Falls Gas Light Co., 34 Wash. 23, 31-34, 74 P. 1004, 1006-07 (1904). See also LeBold v. Inland
Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369, 372 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 675 (1941), modjfedon rehearing, 136
F.2d 876 (1943).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). See note 73 infra.
36. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
37. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (1974 & Supp. 1978) (permitting a corporation to
purchase its own stock); id §§ 251-53 (permitting corporate mergers); id §§ 151-55 (providing
procedures that may be used to implement a reverse stock split).
38. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
39. See 42 Fed. Reg. 60,090, 60,091-92 (1977). See Note, Federal "Going Private" Standards:
A New Directionfor the Second Circuit?, 45 FoRDHAM" L. REv. 427, 442-44 (1976); Note, Going
Private:.An Analysi of Federal and State Remedies, 44 FoRDHAm L. REv. 796, 807-15 (1976);
Note, SEC Rulemaking Authority and the Protection of Investors: .4 Comment on the Proposed
"Going Private" Rules, 51 IND. L.J. 433, 436-38 (1976).
Number 4]
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that a corporation may use to carry out its purpose,40 and protect mi-
nority stockholders only secondarily.4' States have rarely attempted to
regulate the substantive terms of going private transactions. Thus, state
courts traditionally tend to strictly construe their corporate laws. If an
action is technically permissible under the statute, it is likely to be up-
held irrespective of the effect or fairness of that action.42
The strongest traditional safeguard available to minority stockhold-
ers is the state statutory right of appraisal.43 In theory, appraisal rights
prevent or redress unfair management practices by allowing valuation
of shares by a disinterested court; in actuality, appraisal may be cum-
bersome, expensive, and ineffective.' One commentator has character-
ized appraisal as "a remedy of desperation. 45 The opportunity for a
true evaluation of a stock's worth depends upon the presence of a mar-
ket for the security.46 When an active market for a stock exists, the
courts tend to award the dissenter the market price on grounds that it
represents fair value.47 Because the opportunity for a profitable issuer
repurchase due to low market prices generally motivates the decision to
go private, appraisal is not an indicator of fair value to the minority
shareholder. Moreover, the delay, uncertainty, and expense often will
40. See note 37 supra.
41. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1974 & Supp. 1978) (providing for shareholder's
appraisal suit in event of dissatisfaction with terms of short form merger).
42. For instance, to implement a merger and simultaneously deny minority shareholders
their statutory right of appraisal, a corporation need only sell its assets to another corporation,
dissolve the original corporation, and resume its regular business activities. See Orzeck v. En-
glehart, 41 Del. Ch. 223, 192 A.2d 36, aj'd, 41 Del. Ch. 361, 195 A.2d 375 (Super. Ct. 1963).
Technically, if the transaction is a merger, the dissenting shareholder possesses an appraisal right.
If the transaction is a sale of assets, however, the dissenting shareholder does not have appraisal
rights. Although this tactic properly may be characterized as a sham, it is nonetheless legal.
43. See generally Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Shareholder's Appraisal Right, 77
HARV. L. REv. 1189 (1964).
44. See 42 Fed. Reg. 60,090, 60,091 (1977).
45. See Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate
Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 85 (1969).
46. See Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essayfor Frank Coker, 72 YALE
L.J. 223, 231-32 (1962).
47. See Comment, "Going Private"' Establishing Federal Standardsfor the Forced Elimination
of Public Investors, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 638: "In the case of a publicly held corporation, depressed
market prices may be determinative of fair price, with the result that minority shareholders may
be forced out of the corporation for a 'fair' price that is less than the asset value of their holdings."
Id at 656-57. See, e.g., Gallois v. West End Chem. Co., 185 Cal. App. 2d 765, 8 Cal. Rptr. 596
(1960); David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971); Jones v.
Healy, 185 Misc. 400, 55 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1945), aj9'd, 270 A.D. 895, 62 N.Y.S.2d 605 (1946). See
also Tome Land & Improvement Co. v. Silva, 83 N.M. 549, 494 P.2d 962 (1972).
[Vol. 58:883
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dissuade a minority shareholder from seeking the appraisal remedy.48
In addition, state courts' strict construction restricts the remedies of dis-
senting shareholders to appraisal as the shareholder's exclusive remedy
in the absence of fraud or gross unfairness.4 9
State courts, however, increasingly have imposed a fiduciary duty
upon majority shareholders relative to their dealings with minority
shareholders.5" A number of recent cases suggest that state courts are
48. See Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay For Frank Coker, 72 YALE
L.J. 223, 226-30 (1962); Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Shareholder's Appraisal Right,
77 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1192-93 (1964).
49. A fairness standard is often not enforced by courts due to the "exclusiveness" of appraisal
rights. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B, §§ 76, 86-98 (1979 & Supp. 1980); 2 MODEL
Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. 2d § 81 (1971); see generally McGhee v. General Fin. Corp., 84 F. Supp. 24
(W.D. Va. 1949); David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971);
Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Super. Ct. 1962); Bruce v. E.L.
Bruce Co., 40 Del. Ch. 80, 174 A.2d 29 (Ch. 1961); Morris v. Columbia Apartments Corp., 323 Ill.
App. 292, 55 N.E.2d 401 (1944); Geiger v. American Seeding Mach. Co., 124 Ohio St. 222, 177
N.E. 594 (1931) (dictum). See also Vorenberg, supra note 48, at 1195-99.
50. The states of California, Delaware, Georgia, New Jersey, New York, and Wisconsin have
attempted to shield minority shareholders from unfair going private transactions:
California: Under CAL. CORP. CODE § 1312(b) (Deering Supp. 1977), a shareholder who is
frozen out by a short form merger or reorganization, when the same parties are in control of both
corporations, can attack the validity of the transaction.
Delaware- See note 53 infra.
Georgia: The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in the case of Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490
F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974), held that a going private transaction violated Georgia corporate law
because a corporation cannot do by merger what it could not otherwise legally do. In disallowing
the squeeze-out of a minority shareholder, the court quoted LeBold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d
369, 373 (7th Cir. 1941): "Whether we stamp the happenings as dissolution or with some other
name, equity looks to the essential character and result to determine whether there has been faith-
fulness and fraud upon the part of the fiduciary." 490 F.2d at 569.
New Jersey. In Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566 (Ch. Div.
1975). the court struck down a proposed merger because such a transaction involved self-dealing
by the directors and therefore might be a breach of fiduciary duty.
New York: In People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct.
1975), aff'dmem., 50 A.D. 2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1976), the court struck down a squeeze-out
undertaken for the purpose of eliminating public shareholders because the scheme violated state
blue sky laws.
Wisconsin: See Wis. STAT. § 551, reprintedin [198013 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 64,101. This
regulation bears substantial similarity to the SEC's proposed rules 13e-3A and 13e-3B, insofar as
the Wisconsin statute requires both fairness and independent appraisals. Wisconsin is the only
state thus far to enact a specific regulation to deal with going private transactions. See notes 67-69
infra and accompanying text.
Compare Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964) (directors must show good
faith) with Cumberland Publishing Co. v. Adams Real Estate Corp., 432 S.W.2d 808 (Ky. 1968)
(courts will not interfere with management of majority unless there is actual fraud). See generally
Comment, Going Private. An Examination of Going Private Transactions Using the Business Pur-
pose Standard, 32 Sw. L.J. 641, 653 (1978).
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beginning to take a more flexible approach toward the regulation of
going private transactions.51 These courts impose a fairness standard
on going private transactions by scrutinizing them for a legitimate busi-
ness purpose to determine whether the majority sharheolders have up-
held their fiduciary duty52 to the minority.53
In spite of the state court trend of imposing a fairness standard on
majority shareholders in going private transactions, the criteria for the
fairness standard remain unclear. To date, state courts have not con-
51. See, e.g., cases cited in note 50 supra.
52. See Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844
(1974); Jutkowitz v. Bourns, Inc., No. 000268 (Calif. Super. Ct., L.A. Co. Nov. 19, 1975), citedin
Comment, The Second Circuit.Adopts a Business Purpose Test For Going Private." Marshel v. AFW
Fabric Corp. and Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1184, 1203 (1976)); Singer v.
Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Clark v. Pattern Analysis & Recognition Corp., 87 Misc. 2d
385, 384 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Sup. Ct. 1976). See also Gabhart v. Gabhart, 545 F.2d 877 (7th Cir, 1977).
53. Consistent with general corporation law principles, a majority shareholder may not en-
rich himself at the expense of minority shareholders. See H. HENN, CORPORATIONs 319-21, 457-
82 (2d ed. 1970). In Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939), the Supreme Court set forth the stan-
dard of conduct expected of a fiduciary:
[The majority shareholder] cannot violate rules of fair play by doing indirectly ... what
he could not do directly. He cannot use his power for his personal advantage and to the
detriment of the stockholders and creditors no matter how absolute in terms that power
may be and no matter how meticulous he is to satisfy technical requirements. For that
power is at all times subject to the equitable limitation that it may not be exercised for
the aggrandizement, preference, or advantage of the fiduciary to the exclusion or detri-
ment of the cestuis.
Id at 311.
The Delaware courts first adopted the business purpose requirement as a part of the fiduciary
duty of those in control to minority shareholders, in Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969 (Del.
1977). In Singer the Delaware Supreme Court used the business purpose requirement as the first
step in examining a possible breach of fiduciary duty to the minority.
The Delaware Supreme Court recognized that the dominant corporation, as a majority share-
holder standing on both sides of a merger transaction, has the "'burden of establishing its entire
fairness' to the minority shareholders, sufficiently to 'pass the test of careful scrutiny by the
courts.'" 380 A.2d at 976, quoting Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93
A.2d 107, 109-10 (1952).
See also Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977); Young v. Valhi,
Inc., No. 5430 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 1978).
The business purpose requirement also was adopted in a proceeding brought under New York's
blue sky law in which a breach of the fiduciary relationship between controlling and minority
shareholders was at issue. People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550,
af'd, 50 A.D.2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1975). Cf Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277
(2d Cir. 1976) (same merger involved). The business purpose test has since been applied in New
York courts numerous times. See general o Clark v. Pattern Analysis & Recognition Corp., 87
Misc. 2d 385, 384 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Tanzer Economic Assocs. Profit Sharing Plan v.
Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 87 Misc. 2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Schulwolf v.
Cerro Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 292, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
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structed a universally accepted fairness standard.54 State courts offer a
wide variety of definitions for "legitimate business purpose."55 Insiders
offer the following justifications for going private: Danger of financial
collapse,56 elimination of shareholders who are no longer employees,57
elimination of conflicts of interest,58 operating efficiency,59 prudent
54. However, an increasingly accepted approach toward a fairness standard was articulated
in Tanzer Economic Assocs. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 87 Misc. 2d
167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976):
[Wie must conclude that there is no basis for equitable intervention. . . unless (1) fraud
or illegality clearly be shown, or (2) there has been concealment or non-disclosure of
material facts, or (3) that the merger is merely a device to deal inequitably with the
minority and has no valid business purpose, or (4) that there has been a breach of fiduci-
ary responsibility.
Id. at 176, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
55. See, e.g., Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla.
1974); Tanzer Economic Assocs. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 87 Misc.
2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 292, 380 N.Y.S.
2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1976). See generally Greene, Corporate Freeze-Out Mergers: A ProposedAna-
sis, 28 STAN. L. REv. 487 (1976); Solomon, Going Private: Business Practices, Legal Mechanics,
Judicial Standards, and Proposalsfor Reform, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 141 (1975); Comment, Protec-
tion ofMinority Shareholders From Freeze-outs Through Merger, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1421 (1976);
Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903 (1975).
56. The case perhaps most representative in utilizing danger of financial collapse as a busi-
ness purpose for going private is Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952) (en
banc). The Washington Supreme Court in Matteson held that a freezeout of a minority share-
holder motivated by valid fears of financial difficulty is a legitimate corporate transaction. The
court deemed that a legitimate business purpose existed when insiders resorted to a freeze-out of a
minority shareholder when the corporation was on the brink of insolvency, with the proposed
merger the "only salvation" from bankruptcy. Id. at 295, 242 P.2d at 1034. See Polin v. Conduc-
tron Corp., 552 F.2d 797 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 857 (1977) (danger of financial collapse
an acceptable and persuasvie business purpose, subject to strict scrutiny of corporate records to
prevent deception). See also Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Shareholders' Appraisal
Right, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1195-97 (1964).
57. The leading case in this area is Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974), which suggested that elimination of shareholders who are no
longer employees of the enterprise is a proper business purpose. Majority shareholders sought to
freeze-out a single minority shareholder who had resigned from management in a close corpora-
tion after he had refused to sell his interest to controlling shareholders. The majority attempted a
short form merger of the old corporation into a newly formed corporation. The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that Georgia law prohibited the elimination of the minority through merger
when there was no corporate purpose for doing so. 490 F.2d at 565. Accord, Clark v. Pattern
Analysis & Recognition Corp., 87 Misc. 2d 385, 384 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
58. The parent-subsidiary relationship creates conflicts of interest because of the difficulty
and expense of assuring that intercompany transactions will always be handled on an arm's length
basis. See Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla.), a7'd, 521
F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975), noted in Kessler, Elimination ofMinority Interests By Cash Merger: Two
Recent Cases, 30 Bus. LAw. 699, 702-04 (1975). In Grimes, a parent-subsidiary merger was pre-
mised on this conflict of interest problem. The court accepted the parent company's desire to
eliminate potential claims of conflict of interest as a proper purpose for going private. 392 F.
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management, 60 cost of disclosure and deregistration savings,6 drop in
Supp. at 1402. Accord, Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 292, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct.
1976). It is interesting to note that Schuwof was the first New York state court decision to apply
the business purpose standard after its adoption in People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d
120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct.), affdmem., 50 A.D. 2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1975). Prior to
Concord Fabrics and Schulwolf, appraisal and payment was the exclusive remedy available to
dissenting shareholders in a merger under New York law. See Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Bade,
37 N.Y.2d 585, 338 N.E.2d 614, 376 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1975).
Although the elimination of conflicts of interest is generally a valid business purpose, it is not
per se valid. In Young v. Valhi, Inc., No. 5430 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 1978), a Delaware Court of
Chancery considered whether there actually had been conflicts of interest. The court held past
conflicts of interest to have been minimal and rejected out of hand the contention that a merger
would prevent future conflicts of interest. The lesson of Young is that courts must examine the
business of both parent and subsidiary to determine whether a conflict of interest argument should
be accepted.
59. Eliminating the costs of maintaining two separate companies is a legitimate business pur-
pose. Cf. Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla.), aft'd, 521
F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975) (going private transaction approved that promised joint savings in excess
of $300,000 per year); Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 59 111. 2d 452, 322 N.E.2d 54 (1974),
appeal dismissed, 422 U.S. 1002 (1975) (reverse stock split eliminating minority shareholders liqui-
dated because it resulted in a reduction of corporate expenses and a simplification of corporate
procedures); Tanzer Economic Assocs. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 87
Misc. 2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (desire to effect savings that would result from
eliminating duplicated functions, economies in centralized procurement of raw materials, market-
ing economy in joint distribution, warehousing, and advertising, deemed valid business purpose).
See also Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 292, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Cole v.
Schenley Indus., Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,765 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
60. Many observers have noted "the fundamental incompatibility" between prudent manage-
ment and the constraints imposed by public ownership. See Borden, supra note 1, at 1006-08;
Brudney, supra note 1, at 1034-35. This incompatibility is a significant motivation for going pri-
vate. Although prudent management must be concerned with long term growth and stability, a
corporation's public status creates substantial pressure to provide a short term return for investors.
Borden, supra note 1, at 1007. When a corporation claims the business purpose of prudent man-
agement, the court must find that an actual monetary savings would result because of a change in
management objectives.
61. Monetary savings that generally result from going private are a major factor in the popu-
larity of going private. Public corporations have a duty to provide shareholders with meetings,
annual reports, and communications. The cost of these services is substantial. See Borden, supra
note 1, at 1007. Moreover, the expense in diversion of time and attention from regular business
affairs is often prohibitive. Therefore, deregulation avoids the time and cost of servicing public
shareholders, as well as the SEC.
Another cost of a public corporation is the extensive potential liability for SEC disclosure re-
quirements, which compel public corporations to divulge more information than they otherwise
would. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969). See also Note, The Liability of Outside Directors Under Rule 10b-5, 49
N.Y.U. L. REv. 551, 556-59 (1974). In Jutkowitz v. Bourns, Inc., No. 000268 (Calif. Super. Ct.,
L.A. Co. Nov. 19, 1975), citedin Comment, supra note 52, defendants contended that the going
private transaction was instituted for the legitimate business purpose of removing the possible
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market price,62 increasing value of stock, 63 and long term debt financ-
ing.64
The virtually unlimited number of reasons that justify a going pri-
vate transaction make the development of objective criteria to ascertain
their fairness an onerous task. This failure to develop objective criteria
has forced state courts to consider only "evidence of value after the
transaction, which may not adequately protect minority sharehold-
ers." 65 Moreover, because state courts as a rule lack the requisite ex-
liability to public shareholders for noncompliance with disclosure provisions. The court in Texas
Guifrefused to accept the Jutkowitz argument as a sufficient purpose for the proposed transaction.
401 F.2d at 835. The Jutkowitz rationale that cost of disclosure is not a valid business purpose for
going private was reiterated by Commissioner Sommer in his strong statement that the goal of
"avoiding the cost and bother of SEC compliance and shareholder servicing" is not a proper goal.
Address of A.A. Sommer, Jr., supra note 10, at 84,699. Cf Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp.
12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (corporation's complaint that compliance with SEC disclosure requirements
compelled divulgence of business secrets not sufficient to justify going private).
Notwithstanding persistent corporate arguments, the general rule is that costs of disclosure and
savings from deregulation are not valid reasons to justify going private, unless there are substan-
tive supplemental purposes for the going private transaction. But see Tanzer Economic Assocs.
Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 87 Misc. 2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup.
Ct. 1976), in which the elimination of time, expense, and energy incurred in connection with
providing SEC and shareholder services pertaining to the corporation's public status was a legiti-
mate business purpose for going private. It is not clear whether Tanzer is authority for the propo-
sition that saving money alone justifies going private because in that case, monetary savings was
one of ten business purposes presented. Id at 483.
62. See generally H. GUTHMAN & H. DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 622-25 (4th
ed. 1962); Moskowitz, Corporate Stock Repurchase Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 51
NEB. L. REv. 193, 193-95 (1971); Comment, Protection of Minority Shareholders From Freezeouts
Through Merger, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1421, 1443 (1976); Note, Going Private, supra note 6, at 906-
07.
63. Very few cases involve corporations that hold out the increasing value of corporate stock
as a purpose for going private. See, e.g., Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230
A.2d 769 (1967) (implied that it would be a proper business purpose).
64. This argument was accepted only recently as a proper business purpose. In Tanzer v.
International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977), an 81% subsidiary of International
General was merged into a newly created, wholly owned subsidiary. The business purpose
presented and accepted was that the merger would facilitate long term debt financing by Interna-
tional General. Accord, Tanzer Economic Assocs. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food Special-
ties, Inc., 87 Misc. 2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
65. Solomon, Going Private: Business Practices, Legal Mechanics, Judicial Standards and Pro-
posals For Reform, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 141, 170 (1975). See 4 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW:
FRAUD, SEC RULE 101-5 § 12.5, at 275-76. See also SEC Securities Act Release No. 5567, [1974-
1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 80,104, at 85,091 (Feb. 6, 1975) ("Under many
state statutes, however, questions have been raised as to whether the procedures involved and the
tests of fairness developed adequately protect minority security holders.").
Examples of unfairness in the state law realm include: Mathes v. Cheff, 41 Del. Ch. 166, 190
A.2d 524 (Ch. 1963), rev'don other grounds, 41 DeL Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Ster-
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pertise to solve delicate business and economic questions, divergence in
judicial opinion is understandable. 6
In contrast to the case-by-case basis upon which state courts have
generally addressed going private problems, Wisconsin has adopted an
innovative regulatory scheme by enacting the first specific regulations
to deal with going private transactions.67 The Wisconsin regulations
set forth a substantive fairness standard, which creates a presumption
of fairness if three objective criteria are met 8.6  The advantage of the
Wisconsin regulations is that they protect the reasonable expectations
of the minority shareholder while simultaneously preserving the corpo-
ling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1952). See generally 3 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 919 (rev. 1975). See also R.
BAKER & W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1551-54 (3d ed. 1959); Walter,
Fairness in State Court Recapitalization Plans.- A Disappearing Doctrine, 29 B.U. L. REv. 453
(1949).
66. See Gibson, How FixedAre Class Shareholder Rights?, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 283
(1958). See generally Solomon, supra note 55, at 144.
67. See 13 WIs. ADM. CODE § 6.05 (1977). The regulations prohibit a corporation from
repurchasing its own stock if the corporation will no longer be subject to state or federal registra-
tion requirements. Id § 6.05(2). The regulations also provide procedural requirements. Id
§ 6.05(l)(b). In addition, the regulations prohibit repurchase if the terms are unfair. Id
§ 6.05(l)(a).
68. The terms of the transaction shall be presumed to be fair if:
1. The compensation is no less than that independently recommended by 2 qualified,
independent appraisers after reasonable investigation considering all relevant factors,
and the issuer's board of directors states that such compensation is fair to security hold-
ers and was determined in good faith;
2. The latest public offering of the securities occurred more than ten years prior to the
transaction, or the compensation is greater than the public offering price; and
3. More than 50% of the securities held by persons not affiliated with the issuer approve
the transaction; provided, however, the absence of one or more of the above conditions
shall create no presumption as to the fairness or unfairness of the term of the transac-
tion ....
13 Wis. ADM. CODE §§ 605 (1)(a)(l)-(3) (1977).
The rationale for the condition that either the last public offering of the securities occur more
than ten years prior to the transaction, or that the compensation be greater than the former offer-
ing price, is that a shareholder should possess a reasonable expectation that once a company taps
public equity markets, it will remain in the market long enough to give the investor a fair chance
to benefit from an investment, or if the company does withdraw from the market, investors will be
properly compensated. An investor should be able to expect at least a minimal degree of perma-
nence or, in the alternative, compensation in the event of a freeze-out.
The rationale for the condition that at least 50% of the unaffiliated shareholders approve the
transaction is that a shareholder should have some control over his investment even though he
may not be able to control corporate affairs. Because insiders control the timing, the value of the
shares, and even the form of payment, they are perceived as managing not only the corporation,
but also the minority's investment. The 50% rule thus provides minority shareholders with a de-
gree of leverage against corporate insiders.
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ration's right to go private.69
Because the various jurisdictions have worked independently and in-
consistently, development of a universal fairness standard at the state
level has proceeded very slowly. Although Wisconsin has developed a
detailed framework for regulation of going private transactions, it is the
only state to have enacted such a comprehensive regulatory scheme.
Thus, the situation has heightened the need for uniform federal regula-
tion of going private.
B. Federal Remedies
Because the federal securities regulatory scheme provides for the
protection of investors through disclosure,70 attempts by federal courts
to fashion a substantive fairness test have not been fruitful. Yet, be-
cause traditional disclosure provisions have inadequately redressed the
problems of going private,7' a number of federal courts have continued
to search the federal securities laws for an implicit substantive fairness
test.
Commentators have suggested that federal courts utilize section
10(b) 72 of the 1934 Act and rule 10b-5 73 to deal with corporate .freeze-
69. The three objective criteria of the substantive fairness standard contained in the Wiscon-
sin regulation actually serve to protect the right of the corporation to go private, even though they
limit this right. Although the three conditions impose cumbersome restrictions on corporate plan-
ning, they do provide clear and predictable guidelines for the company that seeks to go private.
70. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o, 78p, 78r (1976). See also Note, Corporate Repurchases
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1292, 1296 (1966).
71. One commentator has argued that "it would be best to adhere to established disclosure
rules and to rely upon the shareholder's innate suspicion that things are going well if the insiders
propose to go private." Borden, supra note 1, at 1029.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly. . . (b) To use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security. . . any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
Id See 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW § 2.2, at 331 (1974).
73. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To
make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
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outs.74 The fairness standard never materialized as a bona fide rule of
law, however, because the federal courts subsequently split over the
propriety of basing a fairness standard on rule lOb-5. Consequently,
dissenting minority shareholders found a significant reluctance to look
beyond the issue of mere compliance with SEC disclosure require-
ments.75
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act is the "catch-all" provision of the se-
curities regulatory scheme.76 If conduct is neither manipulative77 nor
74. For an analysis of rule lOb-5 and its role in the substantive fairness debate, see Dyer, An
Essay on Federalism in Private Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 7; Recent Develop-
ments in Securities Law: Cause fAction Under Rule JOb-5, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 503, 562 (1977);
Note, "Going Private"-The Insiders' Fiduciary Duty and Rule 10b-5: Is Fairness Requisite?, 28
BAYLOR L. REV. 565 (1976); Note, Federal "Going Private" Standards.- A New Direction For the
Second Circuit, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 427 (1976); Note, The Encroachment ofRule JOb-5 on State
Corporation Law, 29 ME. L. REv. 218 (1977). See generally Address of A.A. Sommer, Jr., supra
note 10, at 80,010. See also Clarke v. Golddust Corp., 106 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied,
309 U.S. 671 (1940); Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952); Note, Freezing
Out Minority Shareholders, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1630 (1961).
75. See, e.g., University Capital Corp. v. Barbara Lynn Stores, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 94,949 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp.
12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), ardper curiam, 514 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975); Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp.,
135 N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566 (Ch. 1975). But see People v. Concord Fabrics, Ic., 83 misc. 2d
210, 371 N1Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1975), af'dmem., 50 A.D. 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1976).
76. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). "Of course, subsection (c) [§ 9(c) of H.R. 7852, which
became § 10(b)] is a catch-all clause to prevent manipulativi devices." Hearings on H.R. 7852 &
H.R. 8720 Before the House Comrm on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115
(1934) (testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran).
77. The verb "manipulate" means to manage artfully or shrewdly, especially in an unfair
way. WEBsTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1376 (1971). See Banoff, Fraud
Without Deceit: Marshel v. AFW Fabrics Corp. and Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc., 17 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1, 24 n.86 (1977) (quoting Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibiliy in the Management of
the Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW. 883, 905-06 (1976)):
[W]ith a little ingenuity and receptiveness, [manipulative] might have an elastic defini-
tion which would permit its application to other situations either (a) where the form of
the transaction is artificially constructed (as for example in de facto mergers) or (b) the
transaction is essentially a sham or where there is no valid business purpose or (c) by
virtue of coercive actions the minority shareholders could be said to be acting at the will
of another, in the sense that the puppet is manipulated by his master.
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Supreme Court implied that the term
"manipulative" "is and was virtually a term of art when used in connection with the securities
markets. It connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by
controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities." Id at 199. Thus, manipulation as de-
scribed in Ernst & Ernst means non-verbal deceit. Cases involving alleged market manipulation
under rule lob-5 have adopted a similar defintion. See United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341,
352 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d
374, 378 (2d Cir. 1974); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 792 (2d Cir.
1969); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 546 (2d Cir. 1967). See also Rosen-
feld, An Essay in Support ofthe Second Circuit's Decisions in Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp. and
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deceptive,78 however, it is not prohibited under the language of section
10(b)7 9 or rule 1 Ob-5.80 Notwithstanding the language and construction
Green v. Santa Fe Industries, 5 HOFSTRA L. REv. 111, 131 (1976). For a discussion of the mean-
ing of the term "manipulative" in the context of § 10(b), see generally Banoff, supra, at 23-24.
78. Deception first became a requirement of rule lOb-5 in O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764
(2d Cir.), afl7ing, 230 F. Supp. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). See generally Banoff, supra note 77. The
Supreme Court has stated that, absent a showing of a material misrepresentation or nondisclosure,
there is no "deception" within the meaning of § 10(b). See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462, 474-76 (1977).
79. See notes 137-41 infra and accompanying text.
80. It is axiomatic that the rule cannot be broader than its enabling statute, and § 10(b) does
not extend to mere breaches of fiduciary duty. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214
(1976).
The second clause of rule lob-5 is limited to material misstatements and omissions. If any
provision of rule lOb-5 is to support a substantive fairness test, it must be derived from either the
first ("to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud") or third ("to engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person") clauses. Although the term "fraud" as used in clause (c) could mean "equitable fraud"
(i.e., a freeze-out), the consensus is that clause (b) deals with verbal deceit, and clauses (a) and (c)
deter deceptive conduct, (i.e., market manipulation or silent deception). See Cochran v. Chan-
ning Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (undisclosed scheme held actionable because
clauses (a) and (c) of rule lOb-5, unlike clause (b), do not require any form or statement). Cf.
United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341, 350 (9th Cir. 1976) ("clauses (a) and (c) . . . are not
aimed at failures to disclose. Rather they are fiat prohibitions of deceitful practices and market
manipulations").
The legislative history of rule lob-5 suggests that it was taken almost verbatim from § 17(a) of
the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1976), and that it was intended to provide defrauded sellers with
the same protections given buyers under § 17(a). It is reasonable to infer that Congress did not
intend to give broader meaning to the term "fraud" in rule lob-5 than in a closely related section.
See Securities Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). Neither the House nor the Senate reports on
the 1933 Act explain the meaning of § 17(a). See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); H.R.
REP. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). House Committee hearings on an earlier version of
§ 17(a), § 13, however, are helpful in ascertaining the meaning of the term "fraud," and establish
that it does not mean "equitable fraud." Section 13 was intended to deter "fraud by way of
misrepresentation through the mails .... It had to do with the communication of false informa-
tion .. '" Hearings on H. 4314 Before the House Comm on Interstate & Foreign Commerce,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933). Moreover, the legislative history of § 13 indicates that it "does not
attempt to regulate the internal operations of the corporation... "' Id at 116 (testimony of
draftsman Ollie M. Butler). Thus, "fraud," for purposes of § 17(a), and accordingly § 10(b), con-
notes deception, not "equitable fraud."
The phrase "any scheme or artifice to defraud," which appears in rule lOb-5, was construed by
the Supreme Court in Fasulo v. United States, 272 U.S. 620 (1926). In Fasulo the Court consid-
ered whether blackmail letters fall within the meaning of that phrase, and held that coercion,
however morally objectionable, was not "fraud" absent a showing of trickery or deceit. See also
Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924) (advocating violation of Selective
Service Act is not fraud because it does not involve "deceit, craft, or trickery"); Epstein v. United
States, 174 F.2d 754, 765 (6th Cir. 1949) ("Actual fraud has been defined as intentional fraud,
consisting in deception intentionally practiced to induce another to part with property or to sur-
render some legal right, and which accomplishes the end designed."). Accord Post v. United
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of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, a number of federal courts have at-
tempted to stretch these provisions to apply to all intentional breaches
of fiduciary duty, including going private transactions.8 A split of ju-
dicial opinion ensued over whether rule lOb-5 may be utilized to pre-
vent going private transactions that are not deceptive, but merely
coercive in nature.8" The divergent viewpoints stemmed from a funda-
mental dispute over the propriety of expanding the scope of section
10(b) beyond the traditional parameters of disclosure to embody a sub-
stantive fairness standard not on the face of the statute, or within the
legislative history.83 In light of this division,84 rule lOb-5 failed to
States, 407 F.2d 319, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1092 (1969); Shushan v. United
States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941).
81. E.g., Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462
(1977) (holding that rule lOb-5 prohibits all intentional breaches of fiduciary duty, whether or not
the conduct which constitutes the breach is disclosed). Accord, Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535
F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1976); Seigal v. Merrick, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
1 95,467 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). But see, e.g., Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978, 985-86 (6th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977) (court refused to read Green so broadly as to include all
intentional breaches of fiduciary duty).
82. See Address by A.A. Sommer, Jr., supra note 10, at 84,695, in which Commissioner Som-
mer aptly described why coercion in itself is a vice that the federal securities regulation scheme
must recognize:
Faced with the prospect of a force-out merger, or a market reduced to a glacial activity
and the liquidity of the Mojave Desert, and deprived of most of the benefits of the fed-
eral securities laws, how real is the choice of the shareholder confronting the offer of
management to acquire his shares, usually not with their own resources, but with the
corporation's resources that really belong to him and his fellow shareholders? In short,
he usually decides he [had] better take the money and run.
For a discussion of the limits of rule lOb-5, see Bradford, Rule IOb-5: The Search For a Limiting
Doctrine, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 205 (1970); Bromberg, Are 7here Limits to Rule 1Ob.5?, 29 Bus.
LAW. 167 (Spec. Issue March 1974); Jacobs, Birnbaum in Flux: Significant 1ob-5 Developments, 2
SEC. REG. L.J. 305 (1975).
83. See note 74 supra. The legislative history of the securities statutes uncovers no legislative
intent to prohibit "unfair" practices that are disclosed. Although the purpose of the Act is admit-
tedly "to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such exchanges and markets," and "to in-
sure the maintenance of fair and honest markets," 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1976), it is clear that fairness
in this context refers to market manipulation, rather than intracorporate disputes. The legislative
purpose of the Act to prevent "inequitable and unfair practices" is consistent with the language of
§ 10(b), which limits its effect to manipulative and deceptive devices. In short, neither the Act's
purpose nor § 10(b) supports the prohibition against all breaches of fiduciary duty. See H.R. REP.
No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1934); S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1934). There is
no substantive proof of a congressional intent to enforce fiduciary obligations under the 1934 Act
beyond requiring disclosure. See also H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934) (making
clear that the fiduciary duty owed between shareholders is a duty to disclose).
84. Albright v. Bergendahli, 391 F. Supp. 754, 756 (D. Utah 1974), represents the SEC posi-
tion. In Albright a merge-out of minority shareholders was held to constitute "'a device or artifice
to defraud' or 'an act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
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emerge as the bearer of a fairness standard.
The SEC proposed rules 13e-3A"5 and 13e-3B 86 as the first step to-
ward a comprehensive solution to the going private dilemma. Rule
13e-3A would have imposed requirements of both disclosure and fair-
ness of parties initiating a going private transaction, whereas rule 13e-
3B would have required not only fairness with respect to the terms of
the transaction, but also a "valid business purpose." 7 These proposed
rules prompted the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to construe rule
lOb-5 as analogous to the "valid business purpose" test of rule 13e-3B,
in Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp.,88 and Green v. Santa Fe Industries,
deceit' upon the minority shareholders .... " Id. See Howard Weinberger [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 80,052, at 84,898 (SEC staff letter Nov. 7, 1974) (implying
SEC approval of the A/bright holding). See generally Banoff, supra note 77, at 3-10.
The Second Circuit adopted the opposing viewpoint in Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp.
12, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'dper curiam, 514 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975). In Kaufmann the court held
that the requirements of the securities laws regarding going private are satisfied as long as full and
fair disclosure has been made. Two questions, in the court's view, should be asked: 1) Do minor-
ity shareholders have a true choice? and 2) Is the market price of a public corporation's stock
necessarily a fair valuation of its worth? See Note, Federal Regulation of the Going Private Phe-
nomenon, 6 CuM. L. REV. 141, 193 (1975). See generally Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 806
(5th Cir. 1970); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970).
The Kaufmann rationale that minority shareholders need only be fully appraised of the implica-
tions of their decision is generally given in response to the view that corporate insiders acted
improperly in going private. Defendant's Memorandum at 18, and Defendant's Reply Memoran-
dum at 5, Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Accord, University Capital
Corp. v. Barbara Lynn Stores, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) $
94,949 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See generally Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers
and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1974); Vorenberg, supra note 48, at 1189. See also Schlick
v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 383 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[Tlhe equities call for protection
of the minority shareholder when he is the most helpless, as when neither disinterested director
nor disinterested shareholder voting exists as a safeguard"); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d
627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967) (minority shareholder "cashed out" by a short form
merger held a "forced seller" with standing to sue under rule lOb-5).
85. Proposed rule 13e-3A, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11231, 40 Fed. Reg.
7947, 7950 (1975). See notes 97 and 99 infra and accompanying text.
86. Proposed rule 13e-3B, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11231, 40 Fed. Reg.
7947, 7952 (1975).
87. Commissioner Sommer said specifically that he would not include among business con-
siderations the objective of "avoiding the cost and bother of SEC compliance and shareholder
servicing." Address of A.A. Sommer, Jr., supra note 10, at 84,699. In Berkowitz v. Power/Mate
Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 44, 342 A.2d 566, 571 (Ch. 1975), a case arising shortly after promulga-
tion of the proposed rules, the court referred to proposed rule 13e-3B in finding that a freeze-out
merger had no valid business purpose. Although proposed rule 13e-3B did not have the force of
law, a preliminary injunction was granted, with questions raised as to the fairness of the transac-
tion. Id
88. 398 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'das to rule IOb-5 but not as to state law, 533 F.2d
1277 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and remandedfor consideration of question of moot-
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Inc. 89
The United States Supreme Court refused to uphold the Second Cir-
cuit's position in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green.90 Santa Fe firmly
ness, 429 US. 881 (1976), order denying injunctive relief vacated on grounds of moolness, remanded
to district court on question ofdamages, 552 F.2d 471 (2d Cir.), motion to dismiss on basis of Green
v. Santa Fe Indus. Inc. granted, 441 F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In Marshel a corporation had
gone public in 1968 with public offerings of fifteen dollars per share. When the stock price
dropped to one dollar per share in 1974, the owner of 68% of the voting shares decided to go
private by a long form merger of the public corporation with a shell corporation created solely for
the purpose of going private. 533 F.2d at 1279. In an action brought by minority shareholders to
enjoin the merger, the Second Circuit held that the majority shareholder had breached a fiduciary
duty owed to both the corporation and the minority shareholders. Id at 1282. Because there was
no valid business purpose for the merger, the court concluded that the majority shareholder had
defrauded the minority shareholders in violation of rule lOb-5, which prohibits any act which
operates as a fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. Id. at 1281. To
support its holding, the court cited Schoenbaum Ins. v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), and Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 736-38 (2d Cir.
1972) (rehearing en banc). Id.
For an in depth analysis of the Aarshel case as well as the use of rule lOb-5 to regulate fairness
in going private, see Banoff, supra note 77, at I; Rosenfeld, An Essay in Su port of the Second
Circuit's Decisions in Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp. and Green v. Santa Fe Industries, 5 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 111 (1976); Note, The Second Circuit 4dopts a Business Purpose Test For Going Private:
Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp. and Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc., 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1184
(1976); Comment, Going Private and Rule 10b-5: The Green and Marshel Decisions, 47 Miss. L.J.
981 (1976); 10 GA. L. REv. 1059 (1976); 64 GEo. L.J. 1381 (1976); 89 HARV. L. REV. 1917 (1976); 9
IND. L. REV. 1033 (1976); 55 N.C. L. REv. 333 (1977); 45 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 297 (1976).
89. 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.), rehearing en banc denied, 533 F.2d 1309 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430
U.S. 462 (1977), noted in 31 Sw. L.J. 739 (1977). In Green majority shareholders attempted to
merge Kirby, a 95% subsidiary of Santa Fe, with a holding company pursuant to a state short form
merger procedure, solely for the purpose of returning Kirby to private status. Contrary to the
claim of initiators of the going private transaction that no valid ground for applying rule lob-5
had been raised, the Second Circuit ruled that a claim is properly stated under rule lOb-5 "when it
charges . . . that the majority has committed a breach of its fiduciary duty to deal fairly with
minority shareholders by effecting the merger without any justifiable business purpose." 533 F.2d
at 1291. The Second Circuit upheld the minority shareholders' argument that the short form
merger violated rule lOb-5 and was a "flagrant self-deal" in which the majority stockholders
breached a fiduciary duty to the minority by cashing them out at an unfair price without prior
notice or consent. Id. at 1285, 1288, 1291.
The Second Circuit took pains to recognize the distinction between the traditional application
of rule lOb-5 to misrepresentation and nondisclosure situations and the application of rule lob-5
to situations involving a breach of fiduciary duty. Id at 1289-90. Green thus adopted the valid
business purpose test for cases involving breach of fiduciary duty.
90. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), notedin 4 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES
LAW: FRAUD (New Matter) § 4.7, at 400.20-.23 (Supp. 1977). See notes 74 and 88 supra. The
plaintiffs in Santa Fe alleged that the only purpose for the merger was to eliminate minority
shareholders, and that the valuation placed on the shares in the cash exchange was fraud, thus
actionable under rule lOb-5. Contrary to the finding of the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court
held that unless a material, intentional misrepresentation or nondisclosure is proven, a mere
breach of fiduciary duty will not support a rule lOb-5 violation. The Court followed the precedent
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limited the scope of SEC authority to substantively regulate corporate
activity under section 10(b). Justice White emphasized that, because
the SEC only had authority to adopt regulations to carry out express
congressional intent,9 ' the Commission had no power to make rules
that exceeded the scope of section 10(b). Thus, the language "manipu-
lative or deceptive device" could not be used to stretch section 10(b) to
reach mere breaches of fiduciary duty "in which the essence of the
complaint is that shareholders were treated unfairly."92
The Supreme Court in Santa Fe thus created a conspicuous gap in
the federal securities regulation of going private transactions.9 3 The
Santa Fe Court opined that this area was one that Congress intended
to be left to the states.94 The regulatory void left by Santa Fe created a
established in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), by strictly construing the lan-
guage of § 10(b) and finding "no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not
involving manipulation or deception." 430 U.S. at 473. The Court then defined "deceptive" and
"manipulative," a discussion which has proven to be of great value in construing those terms in
the context of rule 13e-3. Id at 474-77. See generali note 77 supra.
91. 430 U.S. at 472 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1976)).
92. 430 U.S. at 477. See id at 479-80 (quoting Cary, Federalism and Coporate Law: Retec-
tions Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 700 (1974)). The Supreme Court's disagreement with the
Second Circuit was in part derived from the former's reluctance to recognize a cause of.action "to
serve what is 'at best a subsidiary purpose' of the federal legislation." 430 U.S. at 478.
93. The Santa Fe case is but a sampling of the Supreme Court's "strict constructionist" phi-
losophy regarding rule lOb-5. For another example, see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723 (1975). In Blue Chp Stamps, the Supreme Court refused to extend the protection of
§ 10(b) and rule lOb-5 to persons who rejected a private stock offering. Because the statute refers
to deception or manipulation in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, the Court
reasoned that only actual purchasers or sellers enjoy the protection of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Id
at 731.
94. See 430 U.S. at 478. The Court was obviously concerned with the effect its decision
would have on state regulation of corporations:
Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the sub-
stantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities, par-
ticularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden.
As the Court stated in Cart v. Ash, supra. 'Corporations are creatures of the state law,
and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except
where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to
stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.'
430 U.S. at 479 (emphasis in original).
The Court articulated this states rights argument as a policy consideration to justify a restrictive
reading of the scope of rule lOb-5. The creation of federal fiduciary principles, the Court stated,
could "overlap and quite possibly interfere with state corporate law." Id
For an analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in Green, see Jacobs, How Santa FeAffects lOb-
5"s Proscriptions Against Corporate Mismanagement, 6 SEc. REG. L.J. 3 (1978); Newton, The Lim-
its ofLiability: Recent Judicial Restrictions on Rule 10b-5, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 63, 97 (1978); 9
TEx. TECH. L. REv. 211 (1977); 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 761 (1977).
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climate of urgency among proponents of SEC power to regulate going
private transactions, which served as a catalyst for the further develop-
ment and eventual enactment of rule 13e-3.95
III. THE EVOLUTION OF RULE 13E-3
Because federal and state courts were unable to deal with the going
private dilemma, the SEC began rulemaking proceedings in 1975 to
ascertain facts, conditions, and practices of going private. To provide a
framework for the hearings and comments and to determine whether to
adopt rules under section 13(e), the Commission proposed two alterna-
tive rules:96 13e-3A 97 and 13e-3B. 98
The proposed rules offered two alternative formulations for regulat-
ing the substantive fairness of a going private transaction. Rule 13e-3A
prescribed objective requirements for a going private transaction, and
rejected federal inquiry into the motive for the transaction, providing
only that the offered consideration "constitute fair value." 99 Rule 13e-
3B was much broader. In addition to disclosure, it required that the
terms of the transaction, including the consideration, be fair.1°° Rule
13e-3B went a step further, however, by requiring that the going private
transaction be consistent with a "valid business purpose."''
Not unexpectedly, these proposals, especially rule 13e-3B, drew
heavy criticism from many quarters of the legal and business commu-
nities. 102 The Supreme Court, in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,
0 3
95. The SEC, however, in promulgating rule 13e-3, "specifically affirmed" its view that it did
have authority to regulate going private transactions. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
6100, 44 Fed. Reg. 46,736, 46,738 (1979).
96. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5567, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 180,104, at 85,089 (1975). See generaly Bacon, SEC Moving to Protect Minority Holders
When Firms Buy Shares, "Go Private," Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1975, at 12, col. 2; Scheibla, Private
4ffair, BARRON'S, March 17, 1975, at 9, col. 1; New York Times, Feb. 7, 1975, at 39, col. 4.
97. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5567, 40 Fed. Reg. 7947, 7950 (1975).
98. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5567, 40 Fed. Reg. 7947, 7952 (1975).
99. The proposed rule required two independent appraisers to determine fair value. SEC
Proposed Rule 13e-3A(c)(2), 40 Fed. Reg. 7947, 7951 (1975).
100. See SEC Proposed Rule 13e-3B(a)(2), 40 Fed. Reg. 7947, 7952 (1975).
101. Id The Release that accompanied the proposals stated that the rationale for the broad
language of proposed rule 13e-3B was to give the SEC "sufficient flexibility to deal with any type
of transaction." 40 Fed. Reg. 7947, 7950 (1975).
102. The SEC received 83 letters of comment in response to its proposals. 42 Fed. Reg.
60,090, 60,092 (1977). A summary of the comment letters appears in [1975] SEC REO. & L. REP.
(BNA) No. 318, A-I to A-6. See also Mulvihill, Securities Reease Analysis, CORPORATE COUN-
SEL'S ANN. 1027 (1975).
103. 430 U.S. 462 (1977), rev'533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), notedin 4 A. BROMBERO, SECUR-
ITIES LAW: FRAUD (New Matter) § 4.7 (Supp. 1977).
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added to the debate. Although the Court in Santa Fe considered rule
lOb-5 rather than section 13(e) of the Exchange Act, the majority ad-
dressed itself directly to the issue of SEC substantive rulemaking
power. The Court held that minority shareholders do not state a cause
of action under rule 1Ob-5 absent proof of deceptive or manipulative
conduct.'04
In response to this position, the SEC publicly took the position that
the Supreme Court's holding was narrow, restricted to rule lOb-5 dis-
putes, and without bearing on section 13(e). The Commission further
contended that section 13(e), unlike section 10(b), was part of legisla-
tion that Congress intended to "close the gaps" in the federal securities
laws. '5 Thus, the rulemaking power under section 13(e) extended be-
yond section 10(b). 101
Shortly after Santa Fe, the SEC refined its position, issuing proposed
rule 13e-3' 07 in 1977. This proposal stated that it would be unlawful
for an issuer to engage in a going private transaction unless the transac-
tion was "fair" to minority shareholders." 8 Although the "valid busi-
ness purpose" language, which was part of proposed rule 13e-3, was
omitted from the 1977 version, the Rule's "fairness" requirement sug-
gested the same extent of SEC intrusion in the corporate decisionmak-
ing process. To critics of SEC substantive fairness authority, the 1977
proposal was no improvement over the two 1975 proposals.0 9 Pro-
posed rule 13e-3B required that the consideration paid in the going
private transaction be fair.I" Under the 1977 version of rule 13e-3 the
104. See 430 U.S. at 463.
105. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967).
106. See 42 Fed. Reg. 60,090, 60,094 (1977). While section 10(b) speaks in terms of "manipu-
lative or deceptive," section 13(e) refers to "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative." "The specific
language of and the rulemaking authority conferred by Section 13(e) which was part of legislation
intended by Congress to close a gap in the Federal securities laws, is in sharp contrast to that of
Section 10(b) which is directed at the purchase or sale of any security." Id at 60,094 (footnote
omitted). See also S. REP. No. 560, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967).
107. Proposed Rule 13e-3, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5884, 42 Fed. Reg.
60,090 (1977).
108. See Proposed Rule 13e-3(b)(i), (2)(i), (2)(iii)(A)-(J), 42 Fed. Reg. at 60,101.
109. See generally Note, SEC Rulemaking Authority and the Protection ofInvestors: A Com-
ment on the Proposed "Going Private" Rules, 51 IND. L. J. 433 (1976).
110. See SEC Proposed Rule 13e-3B, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5567, supra
note 96, at 85,092.
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transaction itself had to be fair."'
In August of 1979, the SEC finally enacted rule 13e-3.1"2 Like its
precursors, the Rule requires the issuer to file information with the
Commission. The proposed fairness requirements, however, were
omitted from the final version of rule 13e-3. Instead, the adopted Rule
requires extensive disclosures regarding the fairness of the going pri-
vate transaction. For example, the issuer must state whether it reason-
ably believes that the transaction is fair or unfair to minority
shareholders." 3 A mere statement that the issuer has no reasonable
belief as to the fairness of the transaction is insufficient." 14
The issuer must also disclose the grounds for its reasonable belief in
the fairness of the transaction," 5 including a discussion of the various
criteria that form the basis for that belief. Boilerplate statements con-
cerning the management's belief in the fairness of the going private
transaction are no longer sufficient."16
Rule 13e-3 mandates expanded disclosure of the "purpose(s), alter-
natives, reasons, and effects" of the going private transaction.' '7 The
Rule also requires a description of both the benefits and detriments of
the transaction to the issuer as well as affiliates and minority sharehold-
ers.' 18 The Rule requires disclosure of any report, opinion, appraisal or
negotiation report received from an outside party relative to the going
private transaction,"' and therefore broadens the information avail-
111. Of the numerous factors listed in the 1977 proposal as indicia of the general fairness of
the going private transaction, only one went to the question of fair consideration. SEC Proposed
Rule 13e-3(b)(2)(iii)(A)-(J), supra note 108. This extension of the SEC role in evaluating going
private transactions was a major factor in the subsequent assertion by state courts that going
private transactions have to be characterized by "entire fairness." The Delaware Supreme Court
was the first court to act in this fashion. See Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). For
an analysis of the Magnavox fairness approach, see Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Cor-
porate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354 (1978); McBride, Delaware Corporate Law: Judicial Scrutiny
of Mergersr-The Aftermath of Singer v. The Magnavox Company, 33 Bus. LAW. 2231 (1978); 66
CALIF. L. REv. 118 (1978); 10 CONN. L. REv. 511 (1978); 57 N.C. L. REV. 163 (1978); 47 U. CINN.
L. REV. 164 (1978); 31 VAND. L. REV. 183 (1978).
112. SEC Rule 13e-3, SEC Securities Act Release No. 6100, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1980).
113. See SEC Schedule 13E-3(H) Item 8, SEC Securities Act Release No. 6100, 44 Fed. Reg.
46,736, 46,745 (1979).
114. Id See also SEC Schedule 13E-3(H) Item 7(d)(l), supra note 113, at 46,745: "Con-
clusory statements will not be considered sufficient disclosure ......
115. See SEC Schedule 13E-3(H) Item 7, supra note 113, at 46,745.
116. Id
117. See SEC Schedule 13E-3(H) Item 7, supra note 113, at 46,745.
118. Id
119. See SEC Schedule 13E-3(H) Item 9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1980). In addition, Item 9
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able to minority shareholders.120
The issuer must disclose any plans to merge, reorganize, sell assets or
employ any other material change after the going private transac-
tion.' 2' Moreover, officers or directors who plan to vote to sell their
stock after a rule 13e-3 transaction, must disclose such plans.' 22 Fi-
nally, rule 13e-3 requires disclosure of the source and total amount of
funds for the going private transaction,'2 3 an estimation of the expected
expenses, and a summary of any loan agreement, as well as plans or
arrangements to finance or repay loans.' 24
IV. SEC POWER TO REGULATE SUBSTANTIVE FAIRNESS
The basis of the so-called going private debate is whether the SEC
has authority not only to require disclosure of material aspects of secur-
requires the issuer to disclose whether it has received any report, opinion, or appraisal or negotia-
tion report from an outside party which is materially related to the rule 13e-3 transaction. Id at
(a). This includes any report relating to the fairness of the transaction. Id If a report is received,
it must be made available to shareholders for inspection and copying. Id at (c). In addition,
disclosures are required about the identity, id at (b)(1), method of selection, id at (b)(3), qualifi-
cations, id at (b)(2), and material relationships between the issuer and the outside party. Id at
(b)(4).
Rule 13e-3(e)(2)(A), (B), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1980), requires the issuer to respond to these
items in a prominent place on the disclosure document:
(ii) Set forth on the outside front cover page in capital letters printed in bold face
roman type at least as large as ten point modem type and at least two points leaded, the
statement in paragraph . . . (A) ... if the Rule 13e-3 transaction does not involve a
prospectus, or the statement in paragraph... (B) ... if the Rule 13e-3 transaction does
involve a prospectus ...
(A) THIS TRANSACTION HAS NOT BEEN APPROVED OR DISAPPROVED
BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION NOR HAS THE COM-
MISSION PASSED UPON THE FAIRNESS OR MERITS OF SUCH TRANSAC-
TION NOR UPON THE ACCURACY OF (sic) ADEQUACY OF THE
INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS DOCUMENT. ANY REPRESENTA-
TION TO THE CONTRARY IS UNLAWFUL.
(B) NEITHER THIS TRANSACTION NOR THESE SECURITIES HAVE BEEN
APPROVED OR DISARPROVED (sic) BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION. THE COMMISSION HAS NOT PASSED UPON THE FAIRNESS
OR MERITS OF THIS TRANSACTION NOR UPON THE ACCURACY OR ADE-
QUACY OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS PROSPECTUS. ANY
REPRESENTATION TO THE CONTRARY IS UNLAWFUL.
d
120. See SEC Schedule 13E-3(H) Item 9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1980).
121. See SEC Schedule 13E-3(H) Item 5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1980). The issuer must
describe such plans in detail. Id See SEC Rule 13e-3(g)(l)(ii)(A), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1980).
122. See SEC Rule 13e-3(g)(l)(ii)(B), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1980). See also SEC Schedule
13E-3(H) Item 5 (a)(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1980).
123. See SEC Schedule 13E-3(H) Item 6(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1980).
124. Id at 6(b).
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ities transactions, but also to regulate their substantive fairness as
well.' 25 This controversy persists despite the form of the test-the
"valid business purpose" of proposed rule 13e-3B, 26 the "fairness"
standard of the 1977 proposal, 27 or the extensive fairness oriented dis-
closure provisions of the adopted rule.' 28
The centerpiece of the going private debate is section 13(e) of the
1934 Act.'2 9 Its legislative history clearly restricts SEC power to adopt
fairness standards in the regulation of securities transactions. Congres-
sional debate on section 13(e) indicates an intent not only to grant au-
thority to enact disclosure requirements, but also to deny the SEC
power to regulate the fairness of securities transactions. 30  The lan-
guage of the original bill in the Senate inferred a broad rulemaking
power vested in the SEC. The original bill granted the SEC power
"necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors or in order to prevent such acts as are fraudulent, deceptive,
125. See notes 129-46 infra and accompanying text.
126. SEC Proposed Rule 13e-3B, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5567, 40 Fed.
Reg. 7947, 7952 (1975) (codifed at 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1980)):
(a) it shall be unlawful, as a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act or practice, for
any issuer. . . to enter into a [going private transaction] ... unless:
(1) if such transaction. . . has a valid business purpose... ;
(2) the terms of such transaction, including any consideration to be paid to any se-
curity holder, are fair.
Id (emphasis added).
127. See SEC Proposed Rule 13e-3, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5884, 42 Fed.
Reg. 60,090 (1977). Representative examples of the substantive fairness requirements in the 1977
proposal are: "It shall be afraudulent deceptive or manipulative act orpractice . .. for an issuer
• ..to purchase. .. any such security if such Rule 13e-3 transaction is unfair... ." Id at
60,101 (emphasis added). The 1977 Proposal also spelled out conditions that bear on the question
of fairness. Id
128. See SEC Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1980). The adopted rule omits the outright
prohibitions of unfairness that were included in the proposals, see notes 126 and 127 supra, but
requires instead that the issuer state whether he "reasonably believes" that the rule 13e-3 transac-
tion is fair to unaffiliated security holders. See notes 113-15 supra and accompanying text.
129. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1976). Section 13(e) em-
powers the SEC to enact rules and regulations with respect to going private "to define acts or
practices which are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative, and ... to prescribe means reason-
ably designed to prevent such acts and practices."
Section 13(e) is a part of the 1968 Williams Act Amendments. SeeAct of July 29, 1968, Pub, L.
No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, amending 15 U.S.C. § 78ni (1970). The Williams Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976), was enacted to protect investors by the traditional full disclosure
of terms, conditions, and financing, as well as the identification of background information re-
garding the offeror.
130. See generally Note, SEC Rulemaking Authority and the Protection of Investors: A Com-
ment on the Proposed "Going Private" Rules, 51 IND. L.J. 433 (1976).
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or manipulative."' 3 ' The fear that the bill would enable the SEC to
interfere in the traditional areas of state regulation, especially fair-
ness,' 32 resulted in the present, more restrictive form. Congress thus
empowered the SEC to adopt rules "in the public interest or for the
protection of investors, . . . (A) to define acts and practices which are
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative, and (B) to prescribe means rea-
sonably designed to prevent such acts and practices."' 33 The House
expressly stated that this change in the wording of section 13(e) was
made so as not to convey the "improbable interpretation" that the
Commission could issue rules not "designed solely to prevent acts and
practices which are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."' 134
Because the legislative history of section 13(e) indicates congres-
sional intent to withhold substantive fairness authority from the
SEC, 35 proponents of SEC fairness authority have relied upon (1) gen-
eralized notions of a "national public interest in the regulation of going
131. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1967):
(e)(l) It shall be unlawful for an issuer to purchase any equity which it has issued in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest, or for the protection of investors, or in order to
prevent such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
Id Note the use of the disjunctive which spells out a broad, vague grant of power to the SEC. To
give the SEC power to prescribe rules as are "necessary or appropriate" or for "protection of
investors" is tantamount to a blank check of authority.
132. See Letter from the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York to the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, June 28, 1968, Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 13, 73-74 (1968) ("In our view, this proposal represents an unnecessary and unwarranted
departure from the concepts of investor protection which the Federal regulatory power has been
traditionally designed to provide"). Former SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen countered this ob-
jection to potentially broad SEC authority. Id at 15 (testimony of Manuel F. Cohen).
133. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(e)(l), 15 U.S.C. 78m(e)(1) (1976). See note 129
supra.
134. The Williams Act Amendments, see note 129 supra, were explained on the House floor
by Rep. Moss: "The original language might be interpreted, although not so intended, as giving
the Commission a broader basis for prescription of rules unassociated with this purpose." 114
CONG. REc. 21484 (1968). See id at 21954 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Bennett).
135. The SEC, on the other hand, believes that an examination of the Exchange Act and its
legislative history indicates a legislative intent to grant the Commission power to regulate fairness
in the going private context. Section 2 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 78b (1976), which sets forth the
rationale for the Commission's regulatory power, states that transactions in securities are effected
with a "national public interest" that makes it necessary to provide for the regulation and control
of such transactions. This includes "transactions by officers, directors, and principal security hold-
ers. . . to impose requirements necessary to make such regulation and control reasonably com-
plete and effective in order to... insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets .... " Id
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private transactions,"'' 36 and (2) a stated, albeit vague, legislative intent
that section 13(e) "fill the gaps" in the federal securities regulation
scheme. Indeed, the keystone of the securities law decisions that
broadly construed the Commission's rulemaking power 37 has been an
express congressional mandate that the SEC adopt rules "in the public
interest or for the protection of investors."' 38
The SEC also attempts to support its "specifically affirmed"'139 sub-
stantive fairness authority by the penumbra doctrine, which states that
the Commission's power to regulate fairness is derived from not one,
but a combination of six different Exchange Act provisions. 40
The argument that the SEC rulemaking authority exists on the basis
of a penumbra pales, however, against the clarity of the legislative his-
tory of section 13(e). 14' The House Report on section 13(e) categori-
cally clarified that such rules and regulations may be adopted only to
define and prohibit fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts.' 42
Proponents of SEC rulemaking authority further attempt to justify
substantive fairness power by conceding the validity of section 13(e)-3's
restrictive legislative history. Focusing their efforts on the phrase
"fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative," they claim that any going pri-
vate transaction that lacks a valid business purpose constitutes a ma-
nipulative transaction. This approach, rather than expanding the scope
of section 13(e), argues that the coercion, which is inherent in a going
private transaction, falls within the meaning of that phrase.
In response, critics of the Commission contend that to attempt to de-
fine coercive, and typically unconcealed going private conduct as
"fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative" would violate the restrictive
congressional intent of section 13(e).' 43 Moreover, to define as fraudu-
136. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1976): 'Transactions in securities
.. . are affected with a national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for regula-
tions and control of such transactions and of practices and matters related thereto. . . ." Id
137. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971); Eason v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960
(1974).
138. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e)(1) (1976).
139. 44 Fed. Reg. 46,736, 46,736 (1979).
140. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13(e), 14(e), 14(a), 14(c), 10(b), & 3(b), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(e), 78n(e), 78n(a), 78n(c), 78j(b), & 78c(b) (1976).
141. See notes 131-34 supra and accompanying text.
142. See notes 128-34 supra and accompanying text.
143. The Subcommittee Report explained that the amendment was made:
To clarify the intent.., that the rules to be adopted by the Commission covering the
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lent or deceptive any going private transaction that lacks a valid busi-
ness purpose would contradict case law. 144 Given the fact that federal
securities laws specifically provide for deregulation of companies145
and delisting of shares 46 without regard to corporate purpose, it is im-
probable that Congress would intend to empower the SEC to utilize its
anti-fraud authority as a pretext for the regulation of fairness.
Thus, the legislative history of section 13(e) provides no basis for an
expansive interpretation, but indicates that Congress actually narrowed
the language of section 13(e). For this reason, neither the statutory lan-
guage nor the legislative history supports the SEC's attempt to con-
struct a broad substantive fairness standard from section 13(e), as the
proposed rules have done.
Because the SEC omitted the controversial substantive fairness pro-
visions 14 of the proposals when it promulgated the final version of rule
13e-3, a number of commentators took the position that the Commis-
sion punted on the issue of SEC authority to regulate the fairness of
going private transactions, rendering the question moot. Closer scru-
tiny of the disclosure scheme reveals, however, that the Commission
did not concede the issue of substantive fairness. Although the drafters
confined themselves to disclosure requirements, the extensiveness of
the SEC provisions and their preoccupation with the fairness and pur-
pose of the going private transaction, prompts the inquiry: Are not the
extensive disclosure provisions of rule 13e-3 tantamount to a substan-
tive fairness standard?
On its face the disclosure scheme of rule 13e-3 strongly suggests the
presence of a substantive fairness rationale. Conspicuous similarities
purchase by an issuer of its own securities were related so/ely (A) to define acts and
practices which are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative, and (B) to prescribe means
reasonably designed to prevent such acts and practices ....
H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Ses. 6-7 (1968) (emphasis added). The House Report goes on
to state why the original language of section 13(e) was changed:
The amendment ... was made ... following consideration of the original language
of the subsection which was in the disjunctive and lent itself to the possible although
improbable interpretation that the Commission had authority to issue rules or regula-
tions. . . quite apart from whether designed solely to prevent [fraud] .... The revised
language makes it clear that such rules and regulations may be adopted only for these
purposes.
Id at 7.
144. See Note, supra note 130, at 433.
145. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g)(4) (1976); .ee, e.g., Note, supra note 130, at 446 n.65.
146. See Note, supra note 130, at 446 n.65.
147. See notes 107-11 and 127 upra and accompanying text.
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exist between the express substantive fairness requirements of the pro-
posals and the probing disclosure provisions of the adopted rule.1
41
For instance, even though the SEC omitted the proposed requirement
that the Commission pass on the fairness of a going private transac-
tion,149 the adopted rule requires that the issuer disclose whether there
is a reasonable belief that a particular transaction is fair or unfair to
minority shareholders.'50 These two requirements are virtually indis-
tinguishable particularly because the criteria for determining the is-
suer's "reasonable belief' of fairness under the adopted rule (i.e.,
approval of minority shareholders,' 51 current market prices, 52 net
book value,"' going concern value, 54 liquidation value,'55 previous
purchases, 56 and reports, opinions, and appraisals 157) are identical to
the factors that the SEC would have utilized to ascertain the substan-
tive fairness of a going private transaction under the proposed rules.
5 8
Ostensibly, the focal point of the adopted rule represents a shift from
a requirement of objective fairness to one of reasonable belief. Actu-
ally, no such shift has occurred. Although the SEC could determine
that the transaction itself is unfair under the proposals, 5 9 under
adopted rule 13e-3 the Commission may charge either that the issuer
misstated, or that he did not disclose his reasonable belief in the fair-
ness of the going private transaction.' 60 Under either standard the is-
suer is in violation of rule 13e-3 on fairness grounds.' 6' Therefore,
adopted rule 13e-3 is the functional equivalent of the express substan-
148. See notes 121-22 supra.
149. Id
150. Id See SEC Schedule 13E-3(H) Item 8(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1980).
151. Id at (8)(b)(1), (c).
152. Id at (8)(b)(1)(i).
153. Id at (8)(b)(1)(iii).
154. Id at (8)(b)(1)(iv).
155. Id at (8)(b)(1)(v).
156. Id at (8)(b)(l)(vi).
157. Id at (8)(b)(l)(vii).
158. See SEC Schedule 13E-3(H) Item 8(b), supra note 113, at 46,745.
159. See SEC Proposed Rule 13e-3(b)(l)(i), Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5884, 42
Fed. Reg. 60,090, 60,101 (1977). See also notes 126-27 supra.
160. See note 127 supra.
161. The adopted version of rule 13e-3 further closes up any potential loopholes from the
avoidance of fairness analysis by forbidding any statement that the issuer has no reasonable belief
as to the fairness of the transaction. See notes 113, 114, 133 supra. Moreover, mere conclusory
statements regarding the issuers' belief as to fairness are no longer sufficient.
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tive fairness standards contained in the proposals, and achieves a sub-
stantially similar objective.
If rule 13e-3, as finally adopted, does in fact regulate the fairness of
going private transactions in the same way as the proposed rules, the
next question is: Does the SEC have the statutory authority to regulate
substantive fairness within the context of its disclosure power?
The SEC must possess greater discretion within the parameters of its
statutory powers to confront the problem of going private. Although
the legislative history of section 13(e) and the 1934 Act do not support
the SEC's desire to stretch the statutory language to include a broad
fairness standard, the SEC should be allowed to breathe within the lim-
itations of its power. Congress implemented both the 1934 Act and the
Williams Act amendments prior to the advent of the going private phe-
nomenon. Thus Congress could not have designed the amendments to
address going private abuses. As a result, these problems have fallen
between state and federal regulatory schemes, with no forum to fill the
jurisdictional void. Given the necessity for a suitable regulatory body
to assume jurisdiction over the going private phenomenon, the consis-
tent failure of state remedies and traditional SEC disclosure principles,
rule 13e-3 as enacted is not only proper, but also necessary for effective
securities regulation.
V. CONCLUSION
Because the fairness standard of adopted rule 13e-3 emanates from
the full complement of disclosure provisions that make up the Rule, it
does not overstep the limitations that the restrictive legislative history
of section 13(e) impose on it. Thus rule 13e-3 requirements are within
the parameters of the SEC's statutory mandate. Moreover, its disclo-
sure provisions are infused with general equitable principles to enable
them to fill the gaps of the federal statutory scheme in a way that mere
disclosure provisions cannot. To fill these gaps, an element of discre-
tion is essential.
Granting the SEC discretion to pursue a fairness objective within the
context of its disclosure authority allows the Commission to require
information that is material to the problem. The coercive nature of the
typical going private transaction raises questions that disclosure of
standard information will not answer. To remedy coercion in cases
where deception and concealment are not in issue, disclosure in sensi-
tive areas of fairness is essential. The concept of disclosure is, as one
Number 41
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commentator has said, "axiomatic," 162 but in the going private realm, it
is of little value unless the SEC has the power to require disclosure in
the right areas. Thus, rule 13e-3 aggressively employs disclosure prin-
ciples to their optimum effectiveness.
Randal J Brotherhood
162. See Note, Federal Regulation of the Going Private Phenomenon, 6 CuM. L. REV. 141, 179
(1975).
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